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DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS, NATURAL LANGUAGE
METAPHYSICS, SAPIR-WHORF, AND ALL THAT STUFF:
EVIDENCE FROM THE MASS-COUNT DISTINCTION
ABSTRACT: Strawson (1959) described ‘descriptive meta-
physics’, Bach (1986a) described ‘natural language metaphysics’,
Sapir (1929) and Whorf (1940a,b, 1941) describe, well, Sapir-
Whorfianism. And there are other views concerning the relation
between correct semantic analysis of linguistic phenomena and
the “reality” that is supposed to be thereby described. I think
some considerations from the analyses of the mass-count distinc-
tion can shed some light on that very dark topic.
1. INTRODUCTION: LANGUAGE AND ONTOLOGY
I begin this work with some reminders of philosophical positions that
have been held in the last 75 years or so—and are still held today
by many—which relate to the way(s) that language might be thought
to characterize reality. I do not intend to describe these positions in
full detail, but only state the parts that I will look to when discussing
the particular linguistic focus of this paper, namely, the +MASS/+COUNT
distinction. Furthermore, as a defense against the charge of tilting at
straw windmills, I spend more space quoting the relevant authors than
I spend in using my own words to describe their positions.
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We will be talking about meaning, about conceptual frameworks,
and about semantics. Each of these is understood in different ways by
different theorists, and so it is sometimes difficult to keep all the claims
and counterclaims in their appropriate places. I’m afraid that I haven’t
done that.
1.1. Universalism
Universalism, in the sense to be employed here, is the view that—in the
realms under discussion—all humans are the same. The realm might
be language, or conceptual framework, or access to “the world”; but
whatever the topic under consideration is, Universalism is the view-
point that everyone has the same knowledge or underlying abilities.
There are varying ways to be universalistic, and we here will look at
two. But not every theory about these topics allows for Universalism,
and that is also part of the story to be told a little later.
1.1.1. Descriptive Metaphysics
In the Introduction to his book Individuals (Strawson 1959), Peter
Strawson characterized his project of Descriptive Metaphysics in the
following terms:
Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the ac-
tual structure of our thought about the world, revision-
ary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better struc-
ture . . . [Descriptive metaphysics is a] kind of metaphysics
which needs no justification at all beyond that of inquiry in
general.
Descriptive metaphysics, as a philosophical activity, is closely re-
lated to other philosophical methods and activities that were common
at the time (1959). The difference is only in the breadth and depth of
the activity, which. . . unlike the related methods within “ordinary lan-
guage philosophy”. . . aims to show even more general and “deep” fea-
tures of human cognition than one can get just from looking at what
underpins and justifies the analysis of ordinary language.
How should it [Descriptive metaphysics] differ from what
is called philosophical, or logical, or conceptual analysis?
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It does not differ in kind of intention, but only in scope and
generality. Aiming to lay bare the most general features of
our conceptual structure, it can take far less for granted
than a more limited and partial conceptual inquiry.
Nonetheless, the analysis of language usage is the best way to pro-
ceed in philosophical inquiry. Descriptive metaphysics is at bottom just
a deeper investigation than what is revealed by the analysis of language
in the ways that were pursued by the ordinary language philosophers.
Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of
the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only
sure, way in philosophy. But the discriminations we can
make, and the connexions we can establish, in this way, are
not general enough and not far-reaching enough . . . The
structure [one] seeks does not readily display itself on the
surface of language, but lies submerged.
Strawson’s book has two parts. In the first part, he says, the aim
is to establish “the central position which material bodies and persons
occupy among particulars.” These kinds of particulars are “the basic or
fundamental particulars.” In the second part of the book, the goal is “to
establish and explain the connexion between the idea of a particular
in general and that of an object of reference or logical subject.” The
result of that second part is, as Strawson puts it, a demonstration that
“the particular [is] the paradigm logical subject.” So as we see, and
as Strawson is at pains to emphasize, the results of the conceptual-
metaphysical investigation and of the linguistic investigation coincide:
language really captures the picture of the world that we in fact have.
But what, it might be asked, should we expect to find, when inves-
tigating the deep, underlying structure of our language and conceptual
scheme? What aspect(s) of our conceptual scheme will be uncovered?
There is a massive central core of human thinking which
has no history—or none recorded in histories of thought;
there are categories and concepts which, in their most fun-
damental character, change not at all.. . . They are the com-
monplaces of the least refined thinking; and are yet the in-
dispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most
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sophisticated human beings. It is with these, their inter-
connexions, and the structure they form, that a descriptive
metaphysics will be primarily concerned.
As we see clearly in these quotations, Strawson thinks that these un-
derlying features are not due to cultural accidents, such as privileged
birth or educational milieu.
But who is the ‘our’ in “our conceptual scheme” and “our thought
about the world”? Strawson’s remark about “central core of human
thinking” suggests that he means to include all living people, or per-
haps all living adult people, or perhaps all adult homo sapiens who ever
lived. Keeping in mind that this conceptual scheme is to be revealed
by the an investigation of language, it seems to follow that Strawson
thinks that any and all languages will, upon investigation, yield the
same conclusion that “the particular is the paradigm logical subject.”
Or as we might be tempted to put it, Strawson believes that there are
universals of language, such that all languages will manifest them in
their underlying structures, and that the notion of a particular as a
logical subject will be one of these linguistic universals.
For that reason we call the project of Descriptive Metaphysics (with
its concomitant view of how language reveals conceptual framework,
and the view that any language will yield the same framework) Univer-
salist.
1.1.2. Natural Semantic Metalanguage
Suppose one thought that Strawson was basically correct in his view
that by an analysis of (“the least refined part of”) a natural language
one could “lay bare” the conceptual schemes of the speakers, and that
those in turn would correctly describe “reality”. But suppose that one
also thought there was a serious problem in just assuming that every
language had the same “least refined parts”, and believed therefore
that there was an important danger lurking in the strategy of investi-
gating just one’s own native language.
To counter this danger, one might try to perform the “ordinary lan-
guage analysis” in all or (at least) many of the world’s languages. As-
suming that Strawson is right in his view that this is the only sure
way to get at the conceptual scheme of speakers of each language, we
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would be faced with the “least refined part” of a number of concep-
tual schemes. It is now perhaps an empirical claim that each of these
conceptual schemes is the same, on these “least refined parts”.
How might one find that out? Here’s the answer from Natural
Semantic Metalanguage: we concoct a “basic, primitive” language in
which to describe the semantics (=basic features of the conceptual
framework) of one language—English, say—and try to use that met-
alanguage to describe the semantics (=basic features of the conceptual
frameworks) of many other languages. As with any empirical task,
such an endeavor may take many iterations, finding that the initial “ba-
sic language” needed some augmentation to describe other languages
or that the initial “basic language” had some material that was only ap-
plicable to English and perhaps a few other languages, but not relevant
to the vast majority of languages.
The resulting basic, primitive language would serve as a semantic
metalanguage for the world’s languages, and by the Strawsonian hy-
pothesis, it would thereby characterize “the least refined part” of all
peoples’ conceptual schemes. And hence it would adequately describe
(that portion of) “reality”. Like Strawson’s position, this attitude is
also Universalist. But the difference is that because of the many differ-
ent languages, one expects that the elements of the “unrefined parts
of” the universal conceptual framework will be rather different than
Strawson discovered in his investigation of English.
Here’s how this viewpoint is expressed by the two most promi-
nent practitioners of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) theory,
Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard. For them the question is (from
Wierzbicka 1994):
Do all the peoples of the world have a shared set of con-
cepts, forming the common conceptual foundation of all
cultures? . . . [T]he universalist position asserted itself, no-
tably in the writings of Franz Boas and his associates,
and in the doctrine of ‘psychic unity of mankind’ (Boas
1938). . . . This volume attempts to vindicate the doctrine
of the psychoic unity of humanity by radically changing
its status—from a faith (for some), and a politically correct
slogan (for others), to a verifiable hypothesis, tested in and
supported by empirical research. (pp. 1ff)
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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The general outlook is further described in Goddard (1994):
Semantic Primitives Principle. There exists a finite set of un-
decomposable meanings—semantic primitives. Semantic
primitives have an elementary syntax whereby they com-
bine to form ‘simple propositions’. (p. 8)
Natural Language Principle. Semantic primitives and their
elementary syntax exist as a minimal subset of ordinary
natural language. (p. 10)
Expressive Equivalence of NSMs. The NSMs derived from
various languages will be semantically equivalent, that is,
have the same expressive power. Any simple proposition in
an NSM based on L1 will be expressible in an NSM based
on L2, L3 and so on. (p. 10)
And finally a strong form of semantic Universalism is contained in the
“Isomorphism Principle”, which is “one of the distinctive hallmarks of
the NSM program.”
Isomorphism of NSMs. The simple propositions which can
be expressed through the NSMs based on different lan-
guages will be fundamentally isomorphic. (p. 10)
Concluding this rapid description of the Natural Semantic Met-
alanguage theory, we point to another acknowledged aspect of its
universalism—that each of the world’s languages has a set of lexical
items or morphemes whose primary meanings are identical to each
other. Goddard says that “this conclusion is fundamental” to the em-
pirical work:
Strong Lexicalisation Hypothesis. Every semantically prim-
itive meaning can be expressed through a distinct word,
morpheme or fixed phrase in every language.
Wierzbicka and Goddard acknowledge that this sort of universal-
ism has been advocated or presupposed by many other writers; they
cite Katz 1981, pp. 226, 238, Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976); Wilks
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(1976, 1977); Schank (1972). But they claim that theirs is the first
attempt to ground it empirically in detailed field work from many dif-
ferent languages.1
One further question remains: does Natural Semantic Metalan-
guage agree that an analysis of the use of language is a way to describe
accurately “the real world”? Wierzbicka and Goddard have been sur-
prisingly coy about this in their writings, although some critics (e.g.,
Matthewson 2003) have claimed that NSM is committed to a rather
strong form of the Sapir-Whorf view that there is “nothing more” to re-
ality than language, and this varies from culture to culture. Matthew-
son (p. 272) cites the following from Goddard (1998):
. . . the comparatively muted quality of the English [emo-
tion] words (except for joy, which is the least common of
them) is consistent with the traditional Anglo-Saxon dislike
of extreme emotions.
. . . the emotion lexicon actually helps constitute the cul-
ture.
And she claims that Wierzbicka is “radically Sapir-Whorfian”, citing
from Wierzbicka (1988a):
Even concrete concepts such as ‘mouse’, ‘rat’ or ‘worm’ are
culturally specific and determined in their content by the
speakers’ interests and attitudes as much as by any objec-
tive ‘discontinuities in the world’.
And Durst (2003), the target article that Matthewson is responding to,
is cited as saying
. . . grammatical categories, syntactic constructions, parts-
of-speech membership, etc. are considered as non-arbitrary
instantiations of culture-specific conceptualizations based
on a few universal principles.
Clearly, these statements could be taken to be some form of Sapir-
Whorfianism (whatever it may be. . . we’ll discuss that later), but they
needn’t be so taken—or at least, so it seems to me. The prevalence
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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of the “universalist” talk in NSM seems to count against the under-
standing of NSM as a kind of Sapir-Whorfian theory. It seems to me
that if NSM were right about there being a universal set of primitive
terms that are constant across all of humanity and cultures, that can’t
be Sapir-Whorfianism, at least not in the normal understanding of that
doctrine. In fact, perhaps the Isomorphism of NSMs is the very best
evidence for the existence of an external world. . . one matching the
way the primitive terms of the universal metalanguage claims it is or-
ganized. (Goddard 2002, p. 19) puts his view like this:
From the NSM perspective, it would make sense to say
that two cultures had fundamentally different conceptual-
isations [of time] if their languages differed in their stock
of temporal primes. . . . Does the Hopi language, for ex-
ample, have equivalents to the proposed NSM temporal
primes, such as TIME/WHEN, BEFORE and AFTER (among oth-
ers)? Contrary to the implication of Whorf’s assertions,
there is good evidence that this is in fact the case.
When asked, Goddard reiterated to me his “universalist” viewpoint
about semantic primitives, and then asked what other evidence could
be requested, concerning the existence of these basic items, than that
they can be found in every language (or, at least, in all the ones thus
far investigated)? And once one has granted “external existence” to
the basic entities, then one needs special reasons for denying existence
to other parts of the “external world”. (Science, perception, etc., can
provide evidence one way or another, he suggested). It thus seems to
me that not only is NSM Universalist in semantics, but it also acknowl-
edges that the primitive basis of NSM does limn reality.2
1.2. Moralism
Moral theorists know where their theories stop—that point beyond
which “there is nothing that can be said”. For them it would in fact be
immoral to theorize beyond that point. In the present case, the point
to stop is where the realm of language meets other realms—certainly
where it meets the realm of “reality”, and also where it meets the realm
of conceptual framework.
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1.2.1. Natural Language Metaphysics
Not everyone is so sanguine as Strawson about the legitimacy or even
just the plausibility of inferring facts about reality from facts about
language. Nor does everyone think that parts of any natural language
can be used to give a non-question-begging description of the ultimate
nature of reality in the way that Natural Semantic Metalanguage seems
to desire, even in the case where the different languages give rise to
isomorphic descriptions.
‘Natural Language Metaphysics’—a phrase coined by Emmon Bach
(Bach 1986a)—has as an end point to answer the question “What do
people talk as if there is?”. So to speak, this enterprise has the goal of
describing what seems to be presupposed by the language one uses, but
it does not attempt to go farther and attach this to any “metaphysical
reality”, nor does it claim that the talks as if can legitimately be the
only evidence to be used to determine what occupies what position in
one’s conceptual framework. At the outset of Bach (1986a), he says:
Metaphysics I take to be the study of how things are. It
deals with questions like these:
What is there?
What kinds of things are there and how are
they related?
Weighty question, indeed, but no concern of mine as a lin-
guist trying to understand natural language.
And at the end of that article he says, extending the modesty also to
the conceptual realm (emphasis added):
I’ve now said a little (but perhaps more than enough) about
some of the kinds of things we seem to need in our ontol-
ogy for English and a little bit (not near enough) about
how we might get them into a semantics for English. It
would be immoral of me as a linguist to make claims one
way or the other about whether or not these sorts of things
correspond to real things in the world, perceptual or con-
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Is there a natural language metaphysics? How could there
not be? One of our main resources for coming to under-
stand the world is, after all, language, a sort of tool box for
doing whatever it is we want to do. Do the fundamental
distinctions that are reflected in the overt and covert cat-
egories of natural language correspond in any way to the
structure of the world? How could they not? But this is
where linguistics stops.
Bach calls this a matter of morality. Others might think of it rather
as a sign of modesty. (But of course, morality and modesty go together
in various of the world’s religions.) There are many writers of linguistic
semantics who seem to take a similar view, distinguishing “semantic
value” from “ontological entities”. I discuss this topic further in Section
3.1.
1.2.2. Sapir-Whorfianism
I don’t intend to enter the scholarly discussion concerning what the
historical Sapir and historical Whorf really had in mind and meant to
say when they came forth with such claims as Sapir (1929):
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor
alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily under-
stood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular
language which has become the medium of expression for
their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one ad-
justs to reality essentially without the use of language and
that language is merely an incidental means of solving spe-
cific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of
the matter is that the ‘real world’ is to a large extent uncon-
sciously built up on the language habits of the group. No
two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered
as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which
different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the
same world with different labels attached.
As well as Whorf (1940a):
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. . . users of markedly different grammars are pointed by
their grammars toward different types of observations and
different evaluations of externally similar acts of observa-
tion, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must
arrive at somewhat different views of the world.
And Whorf (1940b):
We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity,
which holds that all observers are not led by the same
physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, un-
less their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some
way be calibrated.. . . The relativity of all conceptual sys-
tems, ours included, and their dependence upon language
stand revealed.
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native lan-
guages. The categories and types that we isolate from the
world of phenomena we do not find there because they
stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world
is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which
has to be organized by our minds—and this means largely
by the linguistic systems in our minds.
. . . no individual is free to describe nature with absolute
impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of inter-
pretation even while he thinks himself most free.
Rather than evaluating all interpretations of these rather dark re-
marks, it will be enough instead to take one of the many popular in-
terpretations of Sapir-Whorfianism as our stalking-horse in the present
discussion.
The popular understanding of (“strong”3) Sapir-Whorfianism is that
the language one speaks constrains one to discuss “reality” in the terms
given by the language, and not in the terms that would be more appro-
priate to the “reality” itself. It would follow from this that one could
not speak of reality directly, because one’s language would distort it
in ways that a speaker was not in a position to recognize. Or if, per
almost impossible, your language was miraculously the one language
that accurately represented reality, you could never know this. Thus
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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any discussion of reality is in fact a discussion only of one’s language—
and there is no way to go on beyond that.
This version of Sapir-Whorfianism has obvious affinities with Nat-
ural Language Metaphysics, at least in terms of what modesty would
dictate one should claim about reality.
1.3. Radical Postmodernism: Mad Dog Irrealism
When faced with the thought that there is no further evidence that
could be brought to bear that would allow the inference from an ade-
quate semantic theory to the metaphysics of the “real world”, a current
in the stream of thought of the last 40 years has been a variant of
Postmodernism—to deny therefore that there is any “real world” to be
sought. It is not a matter (as the Natural Language Metaphysicians
might say) that we just cannot have any epistemic contact with it, but
rather that it doesn’t exist. Before one thinks of Logical Positivism and
that this response is due to a failure of any possible verification, we
should note that Postmodernists reject the principle of verifiability, and
base their position on a different foundation.
Postmodernists are, generally speaking, social constructionists. A
social construction is an artifact of some particular group, so that when
something is said to be socially constructed, attention is focused on its
“contingent existence on our social selves” rather than any inherent
property or quality it possesses in itself. Socially constructed items
do not exist “in the world” but only through the institutions that give
them “meaning-in-a-culture”. Various social constructivists take this
beyond the realm of such (plausibly) social concepts like good/evil
into all aspects of experience. Berger & Luckmann (1966) puts it that
when people interact, they rely upon their “negotiated” common-sense
knowledge, which comes to be seen as part of an objective reality, even
though it is actually just “negotiated”. And others, e.g., Latour (1987),
continued this train of thought to include what science has claimed to
be objective facts within the realm of socially constructed fabrications.
It is this more strident version of postmodernism that I call Radi-
cal Postmodernism, and the main tenet of this position that I wish to
emphasize is what right-thinking people would call Mad Dog Irreal-
ism. This Irrealist attitude is common in many areas of (post)modern
thought, often linked to doctrines such as “there is no such thing as
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‘objective truth’ ” and “reality (or some specific area of reality) is a so-
cial construction”. Of course, these asseverations often generate such
rejoinders as “go ahead and jump out of your second-story window, if
you think that”. But we will not pause over this more general form of
the doctrine, and instead restrict our attention to a way it has mani-
fested itself with regards to language and linguistic investigation.
Despite the ubiquity of Postmodern Irrealism in current Humanities
academia, this viewpoint is not very common in linguistics and formal
semantics, to my knowledge. However, Dölling (1993) says things that
sound like the doctrine4:
. . . that the world which natural language is about must not
be taken to involve structures independent of man. On the
contrary, our world is linked to our cognitive capacity and
does not exist in the absence of human creators. In this
respect, the semantics has to consider a view of the world
with conflicts with naïve common sense. (p. 134)
One should note that Mad Dog Irrealism is different from Natural
Language Metaphysics. The latter view says that we should not move
beyond the description of the semantic underpinnings of language to
any claims concerning the nature of “reality”. This view does not deny
that there is a reality corresponding to the correct semantics of natural
language, but only that linguistics is not how one would discover that.
Irrealism, on the opposite hand, actively denies that there is any reality
to be discovered.
I think that some features of language can be used to help construct
an accurate evaluation of Mad Dog Irrealism, and the +MASS/+COUNT
distinction may be one such area.
1.4. Summary: Universalism, Moralism, and Postmodernism
Universalists take the viewpoint that they can infer claims about “real-
ity” and “conceptual structure” from facts of language. The two types
of Universalists that we have looked at approach this somewhat differ-
ently, but they each are of the view the inference is justified because
of a confluence of information from different sources. We saw that
Strawsonian Descriptive Metaphysics thought that an analysis of “the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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way we think” (as revealed by a “conceptual analysis of ordinary lan-
guage”) gave credence to the belief that our conceptual framework had
such-and-so features. But then again, Strawson’s description of natu-
ral language itself showed that language required precisely the same
features. The fact that the two different investigations gave rise to the
same results—once in our conceptual scheme and again in our natu-
ral language—is most plausibly explained by saying that the external
world is the constant force behind this.
Natural Semantic Metalanguage, on the other hand, takes the con-
fluence of information to come from an analysis of the semantic met-
alanguages of a wide variety of natural languages. It is claimed to
be an empirical finding that all these metalanguages are “isomorphic”
to one another; and the most plausible explanation for this is that the
languages are all shaped by the external world and its more-or-less uni-
form influence on people no matter where in the world they happen to
be.
Moralism, though, takes the view that one cannot legitimately
make the inference. Some Moralists, such as the version of Sapir-
Whorfianism that we described, think that in fact the languages are
all wildly different—that Natural Semantic Metalanguage’s “Principle
of Isomorphism” is simply false. Given that there is no such evidence
as that presumed by NSM, it would indeed be too much of a hasty con-
clusion to assert that there is an external world that has such-and-so
properties. Before one could do that, there would have to be some
rationale for saying that one or another of the world’s languages is
the “ontologically perfect language”. Furthermore, Sapir’s and Whorf’s
own investigations of the differing societies of the speakers of these dif-
ferent languages convinced them that their “conceptual frameworks”
were also radically different, and so we should make no inferences in
that direction either.
The Natural Language Metaphysician, on the other hand, does not
—or at least, need not—adopt the strong position of Sapir-Whorfianism
that in fact all these languages are semantically different and describe
different conceptual frameworks. Instead, such a theorist takes the
point of view that “deep questions about ontology and conceptual struc-
tures” are not properly answered by seeing what sort of features best
account for our talk of the world. Just because we talk as if time is
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linearly ordered, is no proof that time is linearly ordered or that other
cultures with different languages will conceptualize time that way. And
the reason one should not make this inference in the case of time
is the same as for any area of metaphysics and conceptual structure.
The English language, and perhaps very many others, makes spatio-
temporal individuals be the primary bearers of qualities. But even so,
that shouldn’t provide a justification to make the inference that there
are such individuals in the world. To make such an inference would be
immoral here, just as it would be in the case of Sapir-Whorfianism.
Finally, Postmodern Irrealism is generated from two sources: on
the one hand there are certain things that have only what might be
called “a social reality”— money, perhaps, or rape. While there are
things “in physical reality” that are related to these—pieces of paper or
metal with certain images and a certain provenance, or forcible sexual
actions—the paper or actions wouldn’t fall under the terms ‘money’ or
‘rape’ without some political agreement. This social reality is there-
fore not physical reality. On the second hand, descriptions of “physical
reality” that have been made (in the past) have turned out to be incor-
rect. For some of these claims, it might seem plausible that they were
made for social or political reasons. This in turn throws doubt on any
claim about physical reality. So far this position seems only to justify
moralism: one cannot tell whether there is any physical reality behind
particular pieces of language. But Irrealists take one further step by
claiming that language itself is inherently “social”, and that therefore
there isn’t—cannot be—any physical reality (of the same sort) behind
any particular aspect of language. Nor is there any universal concep-
tual structure; instead, any such structure is an artifact of one’s society
and culture.
2. MASS AND COUNT TERMS
2.1. Philosophy and the +MASS/+COUNT Distinction
We wish to evaluate the positions outlined above on the relations be-
tween language and reality as they apply to a particular phenomenon—
the mass-count distinction. Now, before it is thought that this distinc-
tion is of very limited importance or interest to the various positions
we have laid out and the scholars we have cited, let’s consider some
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of the claims made about the distinction by our various theorists, for
they have pretty much all thought that the +MASS/+COUNT distinction was
important, for one reason or another.
Firstly, there has long been an interest within philosophy about is-
sues whose linguistic manifestation is in terms of a +MASS/+COUNT dis-
tinction. Philosophers from many areas within the field have found this
distinction to be of interest—the metaphysical question of the primitive
or primary existence of gunk vs. things is one obvious area, but also
issues in the notions of identification and re-identification have been
thought to be related to the distinction: is it the same building when all
the concrete has been replaced with new concrete? been replaced with
stone? with plastic? A statue can cease to exist without its constituent
matter ceasing to exist. Does this mean there are two entities here: the
statue and the parcel of matter? The part-whole relation seems partic-
ularly related to the +MASS/+COUNT distinction. Further afield, but still
relevant, are questions about the referents of “abstract” mass terms,
such as in ‘Curiosity is an admirable quality to have’ and in ‘This cat’s
curiosity made it climb onto the counter.’ The fact that ‘knowledge’ is
a mass term while ‘belief’ is also a count term5 have led some to ques-
tion the account of knowledge as a justified true belief, or even that
knowledge can be any species of belief. (Considerations of this nature
can be found in Vendler (1967, 1972), although sometimes hidden in
the terminology of ‘event’ vs. ’fact’, and ‘subjective’ vs. ‘objective’).
Secondly, the specific philosophers mentioned in connection with
the various viewpoints have all taken particular interest in the
+MASS/+COUNT distinction. It was Strawson who first drew philosoph-
ical attention to the notion of “sortal terms”—“terms that provide a
principle for distinguishing and counting individual particulars”—and
distinguished them from both ‘characterizing terms’ (Verb Phrases and
Adjectives) and from ‘feature-placing terms’. This latter category of
feature-placing terms are said to “provide a fundamental basis that is
presupposed even by sortal predications.” And he gives examples
(1) a. There is water here.
b. Snow is falling.
It seems clear from his examples, both of the sortal terms (which “pro-
vide a principle for . . . counting”) and of feature-placing terms (‘water’,
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‘snow’, etc.), that, if he didn’t have exactly the +MASS/+COUNT distinction
in mind, he had some subset of the +COUNT terms in mind for the former
vs. some subset of the +MASS terms in mind for the latter.
Little needs to be said to justify my view that Natural Semantic Met-
alanguage practitioners hold the +MASS/+COUNT distinction to be very
important, since their writings make the distinction particularly promi-
nent. Although one might radically disagree with the conclusions that
Wierzbicka and Goddard reach in their discussion of these terms, it
cannot be denied that they have made the distinction—particularly the
+MASS side of the distinction—a highly visible pillar of their work. Con-
sider, for example, Wierzbicka (1988a) “Oats and Wheat: Mass Nouns,
Iconicity, and Human Categorization” and Goddard (2009) “A Piece of
Cheese, A Grain of Sand: The Semantics of Mass Nouns and Unitizers”.
I mentioned above that Emmon Bach introduced his notion of Natu-
ral Language Metaphysics in Bach (1986a). At about the same time, he
published a piece (Bach 1986b), in which he begins with a statement
about
. . . the close parallels between the mass-count distinction
in nominal systems and the aspectual classification of ver-
bal expressions . . . . To take just one class of examples for
now, there is a parallel between the two sets of distinctions
in their cooccurrence patterns with expressions denoting
numbers or amounts, as in . . . :
(2) a. Much mud was in evidence.
b. (*)Much dog was in evidence.
. . .
(3) a. John fell asleep three times during the night.
b. (*)John slept three times last night.
. . .
The basic aim of this paper is to try to elucidate this
proportion:
Events:Processes :: Things:Stuff.
So we see that Natural Language Metaphysics has also had a strong
interest in the +MASS/+COUNT distinction.
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Whorf (1941) contained a substantial portion that discussed ‘nouns
of physical quantity’, distinguishing how they are manifested in Stan-
dard Average European (the phrase Whorf used for the ways that Indo-
European languages operated grammatically—which he thought were
all basically the same) from how they are used in Hopi. He distin-
guished (pp. 140–141)
. . . two kinds of nouns denoting physical things: individual
nouns, and mass nouns, e.g., ‘water, milk, wood, granite,
sand, flour, meat.’ Individual nouns denote bodies with
definite outlines: ‘a tree, a stick, a man, a hill.’ Mass nouns
denote homogeneous continua without implied boundaries.
The distinction is marked by linguistic form; e.g., mass
nouns lack plurals. . . . Hopi is again different. It has a
formally distinguished class of nouns. But this class con-
tains no formal subclass of mass nouns. All nouns have
an individual sense and both singular and plural forms.
Nouns translating most nearly our mass nouns still refer
to vague bodies or vaguely bounded extents. . . . In specific
statements, ‘water’ means one certain mass or quantify of
water, not what we call “the substance water.”
Whorf uses this sort of difference to argue for the superiority of Hopi,
when it comes to mass nouns that “do not present themselves as un-
bounded extents” such as “ ‘butter, meat, cloth, iron, glass’, and most
materials.”
2.2. A Basic Introduction to Mass/Count Terms in English
In English, mass nouns are those such as ‘water’, ‘computer software’,
‘advice’, and ‘knowledge’. They are contrasted with count terms such as
‘person’, ‘computer program’, ‘suggestion’, and ‘belief’. Intuitively, mass
terms refer to “stuff” while count terms refer to “objects”—although
the notions of ‘stuff’ and ‘thing’ apply perhaps only metaphorically to
“abstract nouns” such as ‘advice’ and ‘suggestion’. Since mass terms re-
fer to stuff, they (but not count terms) allow for measurement: ‘a liter
of water’, ‘three CDs worth of computer software’, ‘too much advice’,
‘many books worth of deep knowledge’. Since count terms refer to
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objects, they (but not mass terms) allow for counting, the use of indi-
viduating quantifiers, and “unitizing” with demonstratives: ‘a person’,
‘three computer programs’, ‘each suggestion’, ‘that belief of his’.
The examples just given were of course from English. Not all lan-
guages follow English in their characterization of this distinction—
indeed, perhaps no other language is quite like English, including even
closely related languages such as German. As we will see below, even
within the Indo-European language group, where this distinction most
closely resembles that of English, there are relevant differences. And in
the wider realm of the world’s languages, there are those that do not
allow plural/singular marking on individual nouns but only on larger
phrases. There are languages that do not have a plural/singular mark-
ing for noun phrases at all (nor agreement with verb phrases); there
are languages that do not have quantifiers that operate on nouns or
noun phrases; there are languages that do not have determiners like
‘a(n)’ and ‘the’ even while marking singular/plural. Thus, the exam-
ples given in the previous paragraph—which make it seem that there
are clear ways to distinguish count from mass nouns—do not have the
same purchase (or perhaps no purchase at all) in these languages. And
this can be seen as raising questions concerning the philosophical rele-
vance of, or interest in the distinction. But for now we stick to English.
An unusual feature of discussions of mass/count, especially in dis-
cussions focused on English, is the fact that the distinction is usually
introduced as a matter of the syntax (and morpho-syntax) of the lan-
guage, but the discussion almost always turns immediately to matters
of semantics. But in this turn to semantics, it is forgotten that the ini-
tial distinction was made syntactically and that the semantic features
that are adduced do not mirror the syntactic distinction. We will look
at this shortly.
2.3. Syntactic Theories of Mass Terms
Many descriptive grammars of English, e.g., Quirk et al. (1985), give
a syntactic characterization of the +MASS/+COUNT distinction within the
category of noun. That is, they view the fact that some noun (e.g., wa-
ter) is a mass term as giving an explanation for why some combinations
with other words are ungrammatical. For example, it is said:
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(4) a. Mass nouns, unlike count nouns, do not have plural forms
and thus all verb agreement is singular.6
b. Mass nouns, unlike count nouns, do not admit of numeral
modifiers.
c. Mass nouns, unlike count nouns, do not allow “individua-
tive” quantifiers such as each, every, some (stressed7), few,
several, many, . . .
d. Mass nouns, unlike singular count nouns, employ measure-
ment terms such as much, a lot of, (a) little8.
This syntactic characterization is supposed to account for the following
classifications:
(5) Mass Nouns: water, blood, cutlery, knowledge, carpeting, advice,
. . .
(6) Count Nouns: person, dog, spoon, belief, carpet, suggestion, . . .
These are all simple nouns viewed as being in the lexicon. . . lexical
nouns, to give them a name. The +COUNT/+MASS features are viewed
by Quirk et al. and others of this syntactic persuasion to be a part of
the lexical characterization of the nouns. These features are to be in-
herited from the lexical items into the larger and larger syntactic units
that are present in extended phrases. So, blood as a lexical entry con-
tains the syntactic feature +MASS, and this is inherited by the common
noun phrases bright red blood and bright red blood that is on the floor
and the full determined phrase the bright red blood that is on the floor.
The fact that this longer phrase is also +MASS is what ultimately explains
why
(7) a. *The bright red blood that is on the floor are slippery
b. *Each bright red blood that is on the floor is slippery
is ungrammatical. (Because the fact that the phrase is +MASS prohibits it
from being plural, as (4-a) says, and hence the agreement with the verb
phrase does not happen as required in (7-a). And the subject term of
(7-b) violates the condition on individuative quantifiers, as (4-c) says.)
Violations of the constraints involving +MASS and +COUNT yield ungram-
matical results that have the same status as other syntactic violations;
(7-a) and (7-b) are no more a part of English than are
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(8) a. *Dog the quickly
b. *A well depending that part thus join.
It might be noted that both of the mass and count categories contain
terms that are “abstract”: knowledge and advice are +MASS, while belief
and suggestion are +COUNT. In Quirk et al., +ABSTRACT and –ABSTRACT are
also seen as syntactic features. Other descriptive grammars might con-
sider them semantic characterizations, that is, as descriptions of the
sort of entities they describe or are true of.
In syntactic theories of +MASS/+COUNT, the lexicon supplies individual
words with a set of syntactic features (and also, at least in the good
syntactic theories, a set of semantic values that are relevant to these
syntactic features). These syntactic features are passed up to more and
more complex units that contain the lexical items (sometimes changing
the values of the features). These larger and larger phrases that contain
the lexical noun also contain the semantic information mentioned in
the lexical items, modified in accordance with rules that describe the
semantic effect of being syntactically combined in the manner that is
employed.
For example, boy might be syntactically characterized as an N that
is singular, masculine and +COUNT, with a semantic value of the set of all
individual boys9; smart might be syntactically characterized as an ad-
jective with a semantic value of being a function that selects the smart
objects or stuff out of a given set of objects or heap of stuff. Then the
complex phrase smart boy could be syntactically characterized as a CN
that is singular, masculine and +COUNT, and its semantic value would be
the set of all individual smart boys. If we now tried to add the deter-
miner/quantifier many to this CN so as to form a full NP, we discover
that it can’t be done because many has a syntactic requirement that it
requires a non-singular CN as an argument. And hence *many smart
boy is syntactically ill-formed (and the question of its semantic value
doesn’t even arise). However, using the to form the full NP instead
would be syntactically appropriate and the semantic value of the smart
boy would be the most salient smart boy in the relevant context.10
If there is no such item then the sentence in which this NP occurs
is semantically anomalous or maybe false (depending on the theory),
but it retains its syntactic good standing. In this general sort of view,
the semantic value of complex terms (CNPs and NPs) that contain mass
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or count nouns as parts are computed as some function of the seman-
tic value of the embedded noun, the particular function depending on
what the other parts of the complex are. Without involving ourselves
in details of just exactly which functions are used for which syntactic
combinations, we can give examples like: The semantic value of dirty
water is describable as, or computed in accordance with, whatever the
semantic value of water is, and whatever the semantic value of dirty is,
when they are put together by the syntactic rule of an adjective modi-
fying a noun to form a CN. This general account of how the syntactic
well-formedness constraints work with the semantic values of syntacti-
cally simple pieces of language to construct the semantic values of the
syntactically more complex items is called ‘semantic compositionality’,
and is a touchstone for most modern semantic theories.
Quirk et al. (1985) said that “the distinction between +COUNT and
+MASS
11 is fundamental to the English noun system and because of the
nominal system’s interaction with the verbal system, it finds important
resonance throughout the language. As we have seen, the syntactic
ramifications of +COUNT/+MASS are widespread: there are quantifiers,
numerical modifiers, and measurement terms that are unique to mass,
and there are some that are unique to count. There is singular vs.
plural verb agreement in English. But in many other syntactic ways,
plural count and (singular) mass pattern together. One of the most
common mistakes that English as a second language learners make
involves topics involved with mass and count nouns, such as choice of
lexical items to be mass or count, whether to pluralize or not, what
modifiers can be used, and so on. Quirk is right: +MASS vs. +COUNT is a
very important syntactic distinction in English.
But as we will see, these syntactic features do not carry over well
to other languages, nor do they carry over well to the semantic realm,
as we will see in Section 2.5. Two more general problems about syn-
tactic theories of +MASS/+COUNT terms are, first, that (almost?) every
noun occurs naturally both as +COUNT and +MASS, so there is need of
syntactic derivation rules to convert each noun from one to the other
category—a terrible syntactic idea (or double entries for every lexical
noun—another terrible syntactic idea), and second, that once this sort
of conversion or double entry is adopted, then the +COUNT/+MASS fea-
tures do no syntactic work: they never rule out any construction as
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ungrammatical on their own. Instead, the noun just gets converted; or
if this is not a possibility, then that impossibility is due to some other
syntactic rule and the +COUNT/+MASS features themselves play no role.
And the positing of syntactic features that never do any syntactic work
seems yet again to be a terrible syntactic idea.
And on top of that, a purely syntactic theory would not give any
insight into the philosophical and conceptual properties that are said
to be of central interest. So let’s turn to the semantic theories.
2.4. Semantic Theories of Mass Terms
Some descriptive grammars of English, e.g., Huddleston & Pullum (2002),
think of the +MASS/+COUNT distinction as a description of the semantic
properties of the denotation of the terms, instead of being a description
of the morphosyntax of the terms. In this type of view, mass meanings
contrast with count meanings in various ways. I collect here some sug-
gestions in the literature, even though not all can be found in any one
work:
(9) a. Mass meanings are true of stuff ; count meanings are true
of things
b. Mass meanings are divisive in their reference; count mean-
ings are true of a unit as a whole
c. Mass meanings are cumulative in their reference; (singular)
count meanings are not true of groups of things which they
are true of
d. Stuff that mass meanings are true of cannot be counted;
count meanings are true of individuated items that can be
counted
e. Stuff that mass meanings are true of can be measured; (sin-
gular) count meanings are true of things that are not mea-
surable
Some theorists take the divisiveness and the cumulativity conditions
together to be called the homogeneous in reference condition.
The fundamental difference between mass and count terms evi-
dently is that count terms are true of objects—entities that are distinct
from each other even while being of the same type, and thus one can
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distinguish and count them—while mass terms are true of stuff that
is undifferentiated with respect to the term being used to describe it.
This in turn explains why mass terms, unlike count terms, are divisive
in their reference: they permit something that the mass term is true of
to be arbitrarily subdivided and the term to be true of these parts as
well. Taking the water in the glass to be something that is water is true
of, it can be divided into parts and is water will be true of both parts.
And again, mass terms, unlike count terms, are also cumulative in their
reference: putting the water contained in two glasses into a bowl yields
something of which is water is true. But the same is not the case with a
count term like dog. Chopping up a dog does not yield more things of
which is a dog is true, nor do two dogs make a thing of which is a dog
is true.12
As discussed above for the syntactic version of +MASS/+COUNT, the
lexicon supplies individual words with a set of syntactic features (and
also, at least in the good syntactic theories, a set of semantic values
that are relevant to these syntactic features). Larger and larger phrases
that contain the noun get their syntactic properties (and also the com-
puted semantic values) modified in accordance with rules that describe
the semantic effect of being syntactically combined in the manner that
is employed. But in a pure semantic theory (of +MASS/+COUNT), the fea-
tures of +MASS and +COUNT are in fact descriptions of the type of “reality”
being denoted. Thus they do not factor into any sort of syntactic well-
formedness. Instead, sentences that violate the “appropriateness” of
the semantic features of +MASS and +COUNT are seen as grammatical but
not interpretable. So the sentence (10) would not be ungrammati-
cal for using an “individuative quantifier” with a mass noun phrase—
it would only be “uninterpretable”, or “semantically anomalous”. By
themselves, the features do not rule out any construction as ungram-
matical, even13
(10) Each bright red blood that is on the floor is slippery.
A major difference between +MASS/+COUNT as syntax and +MASS/+COUNT
as semantics thus is whether these features are seen as syntactic well-
formedness constraints that yield ungrammaticality when violated or
as descriptions of the designata of the terms and hence as semantic in-
terpretability constraints upon syntactically correct sentences that yield
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semantic anomaly when violated.
2.5. Problems With Semantic Theories of Mass Terms
As we mentioned above, many words have both a natural mass and a
natural count sense. So the basic lexical item that gets entered into a
phrase structure description of a sentence will be one of these senses.
It is not always clear how this is supposed to be effected in a grammar,
but we will not pause over that here, and simply assume that there
is some way that this can be done. But even if we can assume this,
there nonetheless seem to be some serious difficulties that are semantic
mirrors of similar difficulties to be found in the syntactic approach.
Many formal semanticists (e.g., Link 1983; Chierchia 1998b,a; Pel-
letier & Schubert 1989/2003) take the characteristics in (9) to be best
accounted for in terms of a semi-lattice theory. A semi-lattice has no
lowest elements and is atomless. The idea is that anything that water,
for example, might be true of has subparts—things in the lattice that
are its parts—of which water is true; and any two elements in the wa-
ter-lattice find a joined element also in the lattice that represents the
merge of those two elements.
But it should be noted that many mass terms obviously are not
“atomless” in the sense required by this theory. Consider
(11) furniture, cutlery, clothing, equipment, jewelry, crockery, silver-
ware, footware, bedding, toast, stemware, gravel . . .
Clearly there are atomic parts of these, and yet they are considered
mass terms by any of the traditional grammars. So it cannot be an
atomless mereology that accounts for the mass nature of these words;
and by extension, since it doesn’t account for the mass nature of these
particular words, there seems to be no reason to think it accounts for
the mass nature of any words.
Some theorists, e.g., Huddleston & Pullum (2002), take this as evi-
dence that terms like those in (11) are of a different nature than what
we have been calling ‘mass terms’, and are to be treated differently.
Huddleston & Pullum call them ‘aggregate terms’ and semantically dis-
tinguish them from other mass terms by their being true of “very dif-
ferent sorts of things”. The idea is that furniture, for example, is true
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of sofas, chairs, tables, carpets, and so on, and that these are “very dif-
ferent” from one another. But a true mass term, for example ‘blood’, is
really true only of one kind of thing.
But one might still wonder: are any words at all that obey the con-
dition on divisiveness? Or put another way, are there really any words
that are atomless—whose referent has no smallest parts? Doesn’t wa-
ter, for example, have smallest parts: H2O molecules perhaps? A stan-
dard defense of the divisiveness condition in the face of these facts is
to distinguish between “empirical facts” and “facts of language”. It is
an empirical fact that water has smallest parts, it is said, but English
does not recognize this in its semantics: the word water presupposes
infinite divisibility.
It is not clear that this is true, but if it is, the viewpoint suggests
interesting questions about the notion of semantics. If water is divisive
but water isn’t, then water can’t be the semantic value of water (can
it?). In turn this suggests a notion of semantics that is divorced from
“the world”, and so semantics would not be a theory of the relation
between language and the world. But it also would seem not to be a
relation between language and what a speaker’s mental understanding
is, since pretty much everyone nowadays believes that water has small-
est parts. Thus, the mental construct that in some way corresponds to
the word water can’t be the meaning of water either. This illustrates a
kind of tension within “natural language metaphysics”.14
Further problems with the semantic approach to the mass-count
distinction come from the fact that there are pairs of words where one
is mass and the other is count and yet the items in the world that they
describe seem to have no obvious difference that would account for
this. On the intuitive level, it seems that postulating a semantic differ-
ence should have some reflection in the items of reality that the terms
designate. But this is just not true. There seems to be nothing in the
referent of the following mass vs. count terms that would explain how
they should be distinguished—as they intuitively are. (See McCawley
1975 for further examples).
(12) a. Concrete terms
(i) baklava vs. brownies
(ii) spaghetti vs. noodles
(iii) garlic vs. onions
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(iv) rice vs. beans
b. Abstract terms
(i) success vs. failures
(ii) knowledge vs. beliefs
(iii) flu vs. colds
To many theorists, these examples and their surrounding facts have
seemed to prove that the linguistic features of +COUNT and +MASS do
not have any backing in reality. Nor any backing in people’s intuitive
understanding of when a word will be +MASS or +COUNT or what it is for
a word to be +MASS or +COUNT.
2.6. Mass Terms in Languages of the World
Chierchia (2010) gives a very helpful three-way division of how vari-
ous languages deal with the +MASS/+COUNT distinction. Without insisting
on the exhaustivity of its classification, or even on the ultimate “truth”
of its vision, we can nonetheless use the labels to give general charac-
terizations. According to this division, the world’s languages fall into
one of the following three groups with regards to +MASS/+COUNT.
(1) Number marking languages, which have overt number features
that obligatorily appear on nouns. Here the +MASS/+COUNT dis-
tinction applies to the nouns directly. (Most?) Indo-European
languages, e.g., English, are such languages.
(2) Classifier languages, which do not have obligatory number mark-
ing on nouns (and arguably do not have a singular/plural con-
trast at all on nouns). Lexical nouns in such languages could
be viewed as +MASS, although there is a +MASS/+COUNT distinction
that is active more generally. (For this reason it might be bet-
ter to view the lexical nouns as unspecified for +MASS/+COUNT).
The classifiers in these languages enforce the +MASS/+COUNT dis-
tinction, but at the level of an entire “classified noun phrase”.
(Most?) Asian languages, even typologically unrelated ones such
as Mandarin, Japanese, and Korean, are such languages.
(3) Languages lacking both obligatory number marking and obliga-
tory classifier systems. Various Amerindian languages, e.g., the
Canadian Dëne Sųłiné, various South American languages, e.g.,
the Brazilian Karitianan, and various Austronesian languages are
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such languages. Some of these languages can possibly be seen
as having a +MASS/+COUNT distinction, albeit on somewhat differ-
ent bases than the foregoing languages. But some of them just
simply lack a +MASS/+COUNT distinction.
The Germanic and Romance languages are, like (modern) English,
number marking languages. They have a +MASS/+COUNT distinction which
characterizes lexical nouns. Nonetheless, the different languages seem
always to have various differences in the specific nouns that are said
to be mass and count. Here are a few examples from French, German,
and Italian.
(13) French, German, Italian are +COUNT; English is +MASS
a. un meuble, ein Möbel, un mobile
all literally translate as: a furniture (in the singular)
‘a piece of furniture, furniture’
b. un renseignement, ein Ratschlag, un consigilo
all literally translate as: an information (or as an advice)
(singular)
‘a piece of information/advice’
(14) German, Italian +COUNT, English +MASS
a. eine Nachricht, una notizia
literally translate as: a news (in the singular)
‘a piece of news’
(15) French +COUNT, English +MASS
a. les pellicules
literally: the films (in the plural)
‘dandruff’
(16) French +MASS, English +COUNT
a. la vaisselle
literally dish (as a mass term)
‘dishes’ (in the plural)
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
29 Francis Jeffry Pelletier
b. le contenu
literally content (as a mass term)
‘contents’ (in the plural)
Chierchia (1998a) mentions that, even though Italian matches En-
glish in having both a mass noun corresponding to hair (capello) and a
count noun corresponding to hairs (capelli), in English one says
(17) a. I cut my hair
b. *I cut my hairs
while in Italian one says
(18) a. *Mi somo tagliato i capello
b. Mi somo tagliato i capelli
The Italian way to describe a haircut is also the German way.
(19) Ich schneide meine Haare.
It would seem that the same activity is described no matter where the
barber is doing the work, so there can’t really be anything in the choice
of mass vs. count.
Moving yet slightly further from English, the Slavic languages also
have a +MASS/+COUNT distinction that nonetheless differs sometimes from
English, and sometimes from the just-surveyed languages.
(20) Russian +MASS, English +COUNT
a. klubnika
strawberry (as a mass term)
‘strawberries’ +COUNT(and +PLURAL)
(21) English and Russian +MASS; French, German, Italian +COUNT
a. mebel´
furniture (as a mass term)
‘furniture’ +MASS
As remarked above, the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese groupings
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of languages are often argued not to make a +MASS/+COUNT distinction
within the lexical noun. This is because, it is said, in these languages no
noun can directly combine with numerals. Instead, a classifier—a word
that indicates a way to “individuate” what is being discussed—is always
needed. The classifier might designate a measure, or some container,
or some shape (etc.) that the referent of the noun is to have. Many
writers, e.g., Hansen (1976); Sharvy (1978); Krifka (1995); Chierchia
(1998b,a), have concluded that the referent of the noun is therefore to
be understood as “mass stuff”, waiting to be “classified” into an object
or a portion or some shape, etc. This is true for nouns such as ‘man’ as
well as ones like ‘water’, so that one is required to say the equivalent
of three units of man, just like three glasses of water. And hence, the
meaning of all lexical nouns is +MASS. However, the work of Cheng &
Sybesma (1999) and (Doetjes 1997, Chap. 7) has convinced many that
the appropriate place to look for the +MASS/+COUNT distinction in these
languages is the classifier system itself. Their view is that some Chinese
lexical nouns do have an “inherent singularizing feature” and thus are
semantically +COUNT. In such cases, Doetjes and Cheng & Sybesma say,
even though the classifiers are required, these classifiers only give a
“syntactic locus” to attach counting terms to nouns that already have
such a meaning within themselves. The +MASS lexical items, on the
other hand, do not have any inherent singularizing feature, and thus
the classifiers relevant to them provide not only a syntactic locus for
counting but also the very unit by which one is to count. And thus
Chierchia (2010) now writes (as mentioned above) that although it is
possible to view the lexical nouns as +MASS, “there is a +MASS/+COUNT
distinction that is active more generally”.
Other languages have fewer syntactic constructions that would give
clues as to whether a noun +MASS or +COUNT. For instance Dëne Sųłiné
lacks obligatory number marking and obligatory classifier usage (Wil-
helm 2006a,b, 2008). A noun occurs with no marking and therefore it
is “a matter of context” as to whether one item or several items, or per-
haps just the ‘stuff’, is under discussion. And like many Athapaskan lan-
guages, there is also no nominal quantification that distinguishes (for
example) All X from Each X—where in English we can use the former
version to designate all water but the latter version only to designate
each individual X. Thus, the sort of ways that one would distinguish
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+MASS from +COUNT in English (and other Indo-European languages) is
not available. And there are no obligatory classifiers that would work
in the way that Chinese, Japanese, Korean, etc., get +MASS or +COUNT
interpretations for entire noun phrases. For instance, the same sen-
tence would be used to assert ‘I cut one hair’, ‘I cut several hairs’, and ‘I
cut hair’. Nonetheless, Dëne Sųłiné does have a prohibition against di-
rect combination of a numeral with some nouns—requiring a classifier
phrase for them in order to use a numeral—and this could form the ba-
sis for a (semantic) characterization of the +MASS/+COUNT distinction.15
In Karitiana (spoken in the Amazonian region), there is also no
±DEFINITE article or other marker making this distinction, nor any explicit
singular/plural marking. Karitianan quantifiers seem to be adverbial
rather than nominal: the expression which conveys universal quantifi-
cation —(ta)akatyym—is composed of a third person anaphora (the
prefix -ta), the verb ‘to be’ (aka) and the subordinate particle (tyym).
So it more literally “signifies something like those who are” (as Müller
et al. 2006, p.126 puts it). Nonetheless, like Dëne Sųłiné, there is a
context that is appropriate for just some nouns: when using numerals
with some nouns, one must use a classifier. One can say (22-b) but
not (22-a), despite the fact that semantically all bare nouns are cumu-
lative: if a pikom (monkey) is added to another pikom, the result is




















‘The woman brought two bowls of water’
The conclusion is that in Karitiana some nouns are syntactically +MASS
because of the interaction between the numerals and the classifiers.
This is different from the Dëne Sųłiné case, where there is no interac-
tion but rather the numeral modifiers just simply can’t be applied to
some lexical nouns.
But even these concessions to minimalist tests for +MASS seems ab-
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sent from the language Yudja (spoken in the Amazonian region, Lima
2010). This language is also a bare-noun language (nouns can occur
without articles or number inflection), and although +HUM nouns (but
not others) can be pluralized, even this is optional. And when left off,








‘The/a/child(ren) eat(s)/is eating/are eating/ate the/a/some
paca(s)
Furthermore, all nouns can be directly combined with numerals with-
out the intervention of measure phrases or classifiers. Lima concludes
that Chierchia’s “signature property” is not exemplified in Yudja and
therefore the +COUNT/+MASS distinction is not grammaticalized in Yudja
at all.
3. MASS/COUNT AND METAPHYSICS: WHY WE SHOULD ALL BE
MORAL
3.1. A Short Review: Semantics
Let’s recapitulate. At various times I have alluded to three notions of
“meaning” or “semantic content”: (a) Externalism, which takes mean-
ing and content to be an item or items in reality (taken broadly so
as to include those who talk about possible worlds and varying situa-
tions), (b) Internalism, which takes it to be some mental item such as a
prototype or concept (again taken broadly so as to include those who
think of these sort of things as being socially defined and then resid-
ing perhaps subconsciously in the minds of individual members of the
linguistic society), and (c) Semanticism, which holds that the notion of
meaning/content is something to be defined entirely within language
and is not identical either with speakers’ mental economy nor with “the
real world”.
It should be emphasized that there is no incoherency in any one of
these notions of meaning/content recognizing that there exist items in
the other categories to be considered in an ontology. Rather, the view-
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points merely insist that the correct account of meaning and semantic
content is defined in their way. But there could easily exist other items;
it’s just that they aren’t meaning/content. For example, an externalist
would agree that there is a mental economy involving speakers (and
communities of speakers); they just deny that this is meaning. Con-
versely, an internalist need not deny that there is a “reality”; rather,
the claim is that this reality is not involved in meaning. And a seman-
ticist needn’t deny either the subjective or the objective; instead, this
view merely says that the semantic content of language is not defined
in these ‘outside of language’ ways.
Obviously, only our Universalists are in a position to adopt
externalism—and even they need not do so. In fact, it is not so clear
that either the Descriptive Metaphysicians or the Natural Semantic
Metalinguists do take semantic content to be externalistic, as opposed
to conceptual. Strawson’s well-known Kantian views, as described
in Strawson (1966), might make it seem that he adopts a Kantian-
conceptual view instead. And since many of the NSM analyses discuss
how speakers of different languages “conceptualize” the semantics be-
ing explicated by Wierzbicka and Goddard, it seems plausible that they
too could be internalists, and view semantic content as being features
of a universal “conceptual framework”, and thus discussing ‘conceptual
frameworks’ rather than features of ‘reality’.
Internalism, the view that meaning/semantic content is some inter-
nal state of the speakers/hearers of a language, doesn’t currently enjoy
a very high position in the philosophical world. For one thing, it is
difficult to see how mutual understanding can ever be guaranteed or
even achieved with such a view. And for another thing, it is hard to see
how any truth-conditional account could be involved in conjunction
with internalism. Still, the position is quite popular outside philoso-
phy, both in the general public and in accounts of meaning that are put
forward in psychology. In our current discussion, we might identify the
internalist notion of meaning with what we have been calling “the role
in a conceptual framework”.
Putting it this way makes Strawson’s “conceptual framework” be
internal meaning while his “linguistic framework” then seems to be a
type of semanticism. His view is then that the fact that the two frame-
works yield the same structures is a reason to believe in Universalism.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Ontology and the Mass-Count Distinction 34
Much of the work in Natural Semantic Metalanguage could also be
seen in this way.
In addition to the Natural Semantic Metalinguists, there have been
various other researchers who have worked to describe the (“internal-
ist”) conditions under which people will understand structures in their
languages. Even focussing just on the +MASS/+COUNT distinction, there
have been many studies describing what types of features in the ex-
ternal world would cause an internal representation to be labeled as
mass or count. For instance, Wisniewski (2009) reports on a number
of experiments that demonstrate that speakers (of English) will take a
newly-introduced novel expression to be +MASS, as opposed to +COUNT,
if it is seen as characterizing entities that are “close together and hard
to distinguish from one another” and which “we do not interact with
the individual parts of”.
This sort of study suggests that speakers of a given language, En-
glish for example, will all come to the same internalist categorization
in the specified circumstances. And hence that, within speakers of a
given language anyway, there is a kind of Universalism. But this con-
clusion is not really warranted, for as Wisniewski acknowledges, there
is no universal agreement within the subjects tested (only some 70%
obeyed these claims), and in any case, there are also terms that do not
obey his postulated features at all and no speaker thinks they do. (Wis-
niewski mentions many, including eyedrops—as in a bottle that contains
a liquid that one puts into one’s eyes. Here we have plural agreement,
and satisfaction of other tests of +COUNT even without the separation of
the parts. And toast, which grammatically acts as a +MASS term despite
the fact that, in each occasion of its use, the speaker is individualizing
slices.) For these, Wisniewski agrees that the +MASS/+COUNT distinction
is “opaque”, and does not track his explanation of the internalistic con-
ception of the stuff. Wisniewski’s conclusion is that the +MASS/+COUNT
distinction is “partially conceptual and partially opaque”. —But then it
isn’t universal!
The version of Sapir-Whorfianism that I have been describing puts
it into the Moralist camp. Arguing against this interpretation, however,
is Sapir’s (and Whorf’s) well-known view that one’s language will have
some effect on one’s conceptualizations. But I think that this effect
is not to be counted as meaning. Sapir calls it “social reality” and
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Whorf calls it a “conceptual system”. As I see it, meaning for them is
language-internal and has these extra-linguistic items as effects. Or at
least, that’s what I am calling Sapir-Whorfianism.
Semanticism—the view that semantics is completely defined by
how aspects of grammar hang together, and is not about any concep-
tual or ‘real’ world—will hold that whatever turns out to be the most
effective way to describe how meaning works in some language is all
there is to be said about the ‘content’ of features of the language, for
example, the content of +MASS and +COUNT terms in that language. The
“meaning” of the feature +MASS is the theory that unites all the ways in
common that describe how individual terms which are categorized as
+MASS operate. And what way an individual +MASS term works in the lan-
guage is to be investigated strictly intra-linguistically. One can see how
this naturally comports with both Natural Language Metaphysics and
with (my) Sapir-Whorfianism—for, according to these views, although
one can describe one’s language “semantically”, any further inference
to a “real world” is unjustified16, or at least would need justification
on some basis other than facts about how language works. Seman-
ticism would also assert that, contrary to the claims of the Natural
Semantic Metalinguists, one should not be surprised to find that every
language you describe semantically ends up looking more-or-less “the
same”—after all, you are using the semantic concepts from your own
language. So this apparent sameness should not be seen as “empirical
verification” of the universality of some external reality, as the Natural
Semantic Metalinguists hold.
3.2. On Morality and Metaphysics
So, what does our discussion about the +MASS/+COUNT distinction im-
ply about these three notions of meaning or semantic content and the
legitimacy of making inferences from semantics to ‘the real world’?
In discussing this, we will need to take into consideration the three
viewpoints of Universalism, Moralism, and Irrealism and to try to char-
acterize how they fit together with the three types of semantic theory.
This means we will want to consider the various possible combinations
of the following:
a) views of what meaning/semantic content is
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b) views of how language relates to reality, and
c) facts about the mass-count distinction
Here are some of the relevant facts about mass-count:
1. The world’s languages differ in that:
(i) Only some languages, the number-marking ones, have
+MASS/+COUNT nouns.
(ii) Some languages, the classifier ones, do not syntactically mark
nouns as +MASS/+COUNT, but only entire classified noun phrases.
(iii) Some languages (e.g., Dëne Sųłiné) have no syntactic mark-
ers to distinguish +MASS from +COUNT, but instead allow the se-
mantic values of nouns to dictate whether (e.g.) numerical
modifiers can be applied.
(iv) Some languages (e.g., Yudja) have absolutely no use of any-
thing that can plausibly be associated with +MASS/+COUNT,
whether syntactic or semantic.
2. Secondly, even within the closely-related Indo-European number-
marking languages, a +MASS noun in one language is translationally
equivalent to a +COUNT in another, as the examples (13)–(21) illus-
trate.
3. Thirdly, even within one language:
(i) Terms that seem to be equivalent in all semantically relevant
ways are such that one can be +COUNT while the other is +MASS,
as illustrated by the examples in (12).
(ii) And anyway, pretty much any term in a number-marking lan-
guage can be used naturally in both a +MASS and a +COUNT way.
For many of these +COUNT/+MASS pairs, there are well-defined
types of relationships between their members, but there are
also numerous pairs that do not have any of these wide-spread
relationships.17
(iii) Finally, there are the phenomena indicated by universal
grinders and packagers.
Thus, if there is a meaning (of whatever sort) to be associated with
the features +MASS and +COUNT, it can’t be externalistic, for the factors
just mentioned would then attribute contradictory properties to reality.
This seems to me to show that Universalism about mass-count is
incorrect if it is taken as describing “reality”. But there is also the
type of Universalism that takes meaning to be internalist. Such a view
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would hold that the conceptual schemes/ frameworks of all people—
regardless of the language they speak—is the same (with respect to
mass-count). Investigation by some psychologists into this issue as it is
manifested within one language (as represented by the material cited
above from Wisniewski 2009) does not make for a particularly convinc-
ing case in favor of Universalism of conceptual schemes: even within
one language, speakers do not seem to be uniform in their conceptual
preferences for employing +MASS and +COUNT. As remarked above, only
some 70% agree in the experimental conditions investigated; and that
seems like quite a far way from Universalism.
In addition, there are others, particularly those influenced by Sapir
and Whorf, who have found Universalism about conceptual frame-
works across languages to be particularly problematic. And while their
work has not usually concerned the features of +MASS/+COUNT, their con-
siderations of other topics do seem to show at least a general implausi-
bility to the idea of such Universalism of conceptual frameworks. These
considerations brought forward by Sapir and Whorf and others influ-
enced by them against the general case of Universalism of conceptual
schemes, as well as the specific worries about “individual-entity-terms
vs. substance-terms” that concerned Whorf (which we mentioned at
the end of Section 2.1 above), seem to cast doubt on the likelihood of
Universalism of internalism. In the case of the +MASS/+COUNT distinc-
tion, an appreciation of the radical differences in how it is manifested
(or not) across languages seems to suggest strongly that there can’t be
universal commonalities in conceptual frameworks.
An early version of this style of critique can be found in Mei (1961).
Although he officially claims only that the semantics of English vs. Chi-
nese are different, and hence one can’t infer anything about reality
from semantics, it also can be seen as a critique of deriving conceptual
facts from facts about language, at least about the +MASS/+COUNT realm.
He attacked Strawson’s Descriptive Metaphysics for its reliance on the
analysis of but one language: English. The attack was made on the
grounds that “Strawson exploits facts peculiar to languages like En-
glish. . . In Chinese, Strawson’s criteria are inapplicable”, and “[Straw-
son employs] Aristotelian arguments based upon the peculiarities of
English and its relatives. . . . [Strawson’s notion of] ‘assertive ties’, and
subject-predicate ‘congruence’ only works for languages with sufficient
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inflection.” Mei concludes (p. 157)
Strawson’s silence [about other languages] can be inter-
preted in only two ways. He must either have thought that
they conform to his criterion or that they are irrelevant.
But the grammatical facts of Chinese do not conform to his
criterion . . . . And to say that they are irrelevant is to claim
that English is the paradigm of all languages. What justifi-
cation can Strawson, or any of his colleagues, offer for this
act of linguistic imperialism?
Strawson, and other proponents of Descriptive Metaphysics, did not
choose to respond to these concerns.
Of course, these worries about cross-linguistic conceptual same-
ness/difference, which seem almost a priori, could be strengthened
or dismissed on the basis of empirical evidence. . . although it is some-
times difficult to see how this could be empirically tested. The propo-
nents of Natural Semantic Metalanguage claim that there is a common
description of +MASS/+COUNT across languages. But despite the survey
of languages to be found in Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002), and the
specific analyses of the +MASS/+COUNT distinction given in other works
(such as Wierzbicka 1988a; Goddard 2009), it is most unclear that
this will carry over to the languages like Dëne Sųłiné, Karitiana, and
Yudja. On the psychology side, Iwasaki et al. (2010) probed for dif-
ferences in “conceptualization” between English speakers (where there
is a +MASS/+COUNT distinction) and Japanese speakers (where the bare
nouns do not exhibit +MASS/+COUNT, but the information is conveyed
by the classifier system). Their results were that Japanese speakers
were conceptually as sensitive to the +MASS/+COUNT distinction as En-
glish speakers, even though their language doesn’t contain a morpho-
logical marking of the distinction on simple nouns. These results are
suggestive of Universalism in conceptual framework (with regards to
+MASS/+COUNT), but more cross-linguistic study is required.18 Nonethe-
less, it seems to me that the balance of evidence (such as it is, includ-
ing this empirical study and also the a priori considerations) makes
Universalism of conceptual framework (with respect to +MASS/+COUNT)
unlikely, and that other evidence needs to be amassed before it can be
accepted.
The radical Postmodern Irrealism cannot, of course, embody exter-
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nalism, since by its definition it is committed to denying the existence
of an “external reality”. It is most naturally taken to embrace some
sort of internalism as its semantic theory, since the notion of “social
construction” is what is seen as making all members of a given soci-
ety agree about the force of socially constructed items. But in turn, this
implies that Postmodern Irrealism cannot embrace Universalism of con-
ceptual framework either—for, each social grouping is to create their
own constructions. And while social construction theorists have not (to
my knowledge) made any pronouncements about the +MASS/+COUNT dis-
tinction and whether it is one of the socially-constrained constructions,
it seems likely that they would categorize it in this way. If so, then
Postmodern Irrealism would seem to be committed to semanticism as
its semantic theory: an analysis of (the semantics of) language cannot
go beyond language, unless there are some other features brought to
bear, such as an independent account of what items have been con-
structed and in which way. But this is not something that language
itself can tell us.
In one respect, then, Postmodern Irrealists are in agreement with
Moralists: one should not, and indeed, cannot in good conscience,
make inferences from facts of language to conceptual features or to fea-
tures of reality—at least, not without evidence that comes from sources
other than language and linguistic analysis. But these Irrealists sepa-
rate themselves from Moralists in not obeying this stricture, for they
go on to draw the further conclusion that “there is no objective real-
ity”. Certainly this seems an incoherence in their position, and they
would be better off—and still able to embrace many (all?) of their
other doctrines—by adopting Moralism.
Moralism and semanticism seem to be natural bedfellows. Since a
Moralist denies that the results of a linguistic analysis yield information
about reality, s/he can’t then think that meaning is externalistic. And
similarly, since s/he denies that one can draw inferences about con-
ceptual scheme from a semantic analysis, internalism about meaning
is also ruled out.
So what overall conclusions should we draw about +MASS/+COUNT
and its effect on our semantic theories and the three general attitudes?
(A) We have ruled out:
(i) Universalism with an externalistic semantics, because
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Ontology and the Mass-Count Distinction 40
+MASS/+COUNT cannot be seen as universally describing an ex-
ternal world.
(ii) Universalism with a semanticism attitude, because that con-
tradicts the basic tenet of Universalism.
(iii) Moralism with an externalistic semantics, because this con-
tradicts the whole point of Moralism.
(iv) Moralism with an internalistic semantics, because it contra-
dicts the whole point of Moralism.
(v) Irrealism with an externalistic semantics, because Irrealism
denies an external world.
(vi) Irrealism with an internalistic semantics, because Irrealism
believes that different social orders yield different social kinds.
(vii) Irrealism with a semanticism attitude, because semanticism
prohibits an inference to any claim about reality, including
its non-existence.
(B) We have cast doubt on
(i) Universalism with an internalistic semantics, because it just
seems unlikely that speakers of different languages will all
have the same conceptual schemes. But this is an empirical
hypothesis, and might be susceptible to the sort of verifica-
tion proposed by Natural Semantics Metalanguage theorists.
(C) Here, then, is what I think comprise the two main open possibili-
ties (not taking seriously Universalism with an internalistic seman-
tics):
(i) Moralism with a semanticist attitude. The idea is that
+MASS/+COUNT has semantic reflexes, and is an important fea-
ture in describing the semantic properties of (at least some)
languages. However, we cannot infer from this that there
is any corresponding feature of reality nor that speakers
of all languages will have such properties in mind when-
ever they employ such terms. To make these sorts of in-
ferences involves investigations that are outside the realm
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of “linguistic analysis” and into metaphysical or psychologi-
cal/sociological studies about which it would be immoral for
the linguists/semanticists/philosophers of language to tread.
(ii) Finally, we might wish to deny that +MASS/+COUNT is a basic
or fundamental distinction of language at all, and hold that
it does not form a part of the fundamental semantic basis
of any language. Since it’s not a part of the fundamental
semantics, it neither describes any feature of reality or of
the conceptual framework of any speakers. Rather, it is akin
to grammatical gender: some languages have it, but (e.g.)
German speakers do not think that eine Brücke is biologically
feminine nor do Spanish speakers think that un puente is bi-
ologically masculine. Nor do these speakers conceptualize
bridges as feminine or masculine.19
The two possibilities grouped under (C) have in common the propo-
sition that the +MASS/+COUNT distinction in language should not be
used to make claims about either the physical or the conceptual re-
ality/importance of any possibly related distinction.
And that is what I believe. But let me be clear: I am also a believer
in the importance of such philosophical distinctions as stuff vs. things.
What I am denying is that the semantic analysis of language offers any
insight at all into these features of reality and conceptual schemes.20
Notes
1See also their works Wierzbicka (1988b, 1996); Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002), and
others. Of interest too is the special issue of Theoretical Linguistics 29 [2003], which
used Durst (2003) as a target article about NSM and contained many responses.
2We discuss this issue again for NSM in Section 3.
3The strong/weak distinction in the context of Whorfianism was popularized by Penn
(1972). Penn dismissed Whorfianism on various grounds, including the view that weak
interpretations (“one’s language affects one’s thought”) was too vapid to be interesting
while the strong interpretation (“one’s language determines one’s thought”) was too
outrageous to be taken seriously.
4Dölling also says things that are more like Descriptive Metaphysics (a doctrine that
he explicitly approves of on pp. 134-135), and he also takes a Kantian view of the matter
when he says (p. 137) “. . . the world as experienced is not independent of the human
mind. Instead . . . this world has to be conceived of as the result of an interaction between
environmental input and certain mental principles that impose structure on that input.
More generally, in analogy to ideas of Kant, the ontology of the commonsense world is
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determined by a ‘categorial framework’ with is a part of the genetic inheritance of human
beings and, as such, universal.” Despite these similarities to Descriptive Metaphysics, I
am using him as a linguist spokesman for Irrealism, in the absence of other clearer cases.
5Except possibly in certain postmodernist argot, the phrases ∗a knowledge and
∗knowledges seem particularly bad, while a belief and beliefs are unexceptional. How-
ever, belief can also be used in a mass way, as in There is less belief in witches now than
there was two centuries ago. So the challenge is to show how a belief (an individual “ob-
ject” that is designated by a count term) can become knowledge (since it can’t become a
knowledge.
6With some possible exceptions, such as oats and smarts. Two categories of nouns
I’ll not discuss in this paper are collectives and pluralia tantum. The former are singular
count nouns that refer to multiple entities, and includes such terms as team, committee,
army, herd, etc. The latter are inherently plural nouns that nonetheless sometimes seem
to be like mass nouns. One subtype of this latter refers to “dual entities” and includes
such terms as scissors, earmuffs, pliers, binoculars, etc. Another subtype is associated with
co-occurring similar objects, and includes suds, intestines, bleachers, ruins, remains, etc.
Yet a third subtype refers to groups of objects, and includes terms like groceries, spoils,
odds and ends, valuables, contents, etc. Both the collectives and the pluralia tantum nouns
challenge certain definitions of the +MASS/+COUNT distinction.
7The unreduced (“stressed”) quantifier some, as in Some student aced the exam, is to
be distinguished from the reduced or unstressed some, as in John drank some water. The
literature usually spells this latter unstressed article ‘sm’. In addition to its use with mass
terms, sm can also be used with plural count nouns. It is rather more difficult to use
the unreduced some with mass nouns, although it is perhaps used with an implicature
of “but I don’t know what (kind)”, as in Some gunfire woke me up. [Thanks to Barbara
Partee for this latter observation].
8Little and a little are measure terms, not size- (or importance-) indicating adjectives.
(They contrast with a lot of rather than with large).
9The semantic value is only for the purposes of this example. I expand on the possible
different types of semantic values below, in Section 3.1. But whatever the semantic value
is, the more general point being made in the main text still holds.
10Again, the semantic value is just for expository purposes.
11Quirk et al. (1985), like many of the linguistically-oriented authors prefer the name
–CNT —often with the idea that there are more types of non-count terms than the tradi-
tional ‘mass’ would suggest—but we will continue with the more philosophically usual
name, +MASS.
12Other than in a Frankenstein-like scenario.
13This example might be ruled ungrammatical on other grounds, but not on the grounds
of +MASS/+COUNT.
14For a description of, and defense of approaching metaphysics this way, see Bach
(1986b,a).
15Wilhelm calls this a semantic characterization. It seems to be a syntactic charac-
terization to Chierchia (2010), who calls this “the signature property” of mass nouns.
Chierchia also suggests (p. 108fn8) that there may be many other languages, such as the
Austronesian languages, that follow this pattern.
16Despite this natural position for Sapir-Whorfianism to take, Whorf himself thought
that there was a definite metaphysical reality beyond one’s language, and in fact he
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thought that some languages approached it more accurately than others. For instance,
in (Whorf 1941, 150ff) he expressed the view that the Hopi notion of time and event
formed a better picture of reality than that of Standard Average European. But this
aspect of Whorf’s views is not a part of the view I have been calling Sapir-Whorfianism.
17For a summary of the well-established relationships, see Huddleston & Pullum 2002,
pp. 336–337.
18And, one might doubt whether their specific example words—which were chosen
from the food domain—differ only with regard to +MASS/+COUNT features. There might
be some other feature(s) that are responsible for English and Japanese speakers to cat-
egorize the foods similarly. (Iwasaki et al. rule out visual similarity as a possibility, but
there are other possibilities—for instance, ‘often eaten together’ or ‘you have to peel
them both’, and so on).
19This sketch of a position takes the opposite point of view from Boroditsky et al.
(2003), from which paper the example is taken.
20I very much need to thank Michael Glanzberg and Barbara Partee for their detailed
comments on an earlier version of this paper. It is much the better for my changing it
in some of the ways they suggested and dealing with some of the topics that worried
them. It would probably be a lot better still, had I had the time and ability to deal with
a number of other issues that they raised.
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